







Pragmatic Social Actor Theory
Proposals for a Convergence of French
Sociologies
Bruno Frère
For or Against Pierre Bourdieu
PIERRE BOURDIEU died in Paris on 23 January 2002. He left some40 book-length essays and over 200 articles. Unpublished texts arebeing brought out, and much more is to come. Even before his death,
sociology textbooks presented his genetic structuralism (which he some-
times also called structuralist constructivism in opposition to Bloor’s or
Latour’s relativist constructivism [Bourdieu, 2001: 41]) as ‘one of the most
significant [sociologies] to appear in France after the war’ (Corcuff, 1995:
41–2). Despite the fact that textbooks and sociology courses cannot avoid
mentioning Bourdieu, and that the public at large is in general favourably
inclined towards him, the scientific community is increasingly divided. 
On the one hand, his faithful French-speaking followers maintain that
his theory is a genuine ‘symbolic revolution, a new way to perceive the social
world’ (Pinto, 1998: 224). This revolution has also spread beyond French-
speaking areas and, in the UK, some consider Bourdieu’s system to be ‘the
most comprehensive and sophisticated available at present’ (Fowler, 1997).
On the other hand, we have those he used to call his most ‘fervent enemies’.
J. Verdès-Leroux, one of his earliest followers, contends today that Pierre
Bourdieu’s sociology is merely an ‘ideological discourse’ and a ‘scientific








mythology’ which develops a ‘vindictive vision of the social world’ (1998:
237–8). Jeffrey C. Alexander thinks that Bourdieu’s texts are too impover-
ished and deterministic. He concludes that ‘his portrait of modern society
can provide neither the theoretical nor the empirical resources for under-
standing, much less appreciating the pluralist and democratic dimensions
of contemporary societies’ (1995: 131).
In the final analysis, critiques of Bourdieu’s genetic structuralism first
emerged among French advocates of rational action theory. According to
Boudon, for example, Bourdieu oversimplifies social mechanisms. With a
concept such as habitus ‘explanatory black boxes factors could easily be
produced’, these black boxes determining all our actions (1998: 175).1 This
is a recurrent theme among Bourdieu’s critics. In particular, the journal
Esprit was engaged in a long polemic with him. The contributing authors
agreed unanimously to reject ‘his determinist sociology which continuously
reduced the subject’s margin of liberty and locked him into a given position
and pre-determined function under the weight of social structure’ (Mongin
and Roman 1998: 181; see also Maigret, 2002). Similarly, other early follow-
ers, such as Verdès-Leroux, believe that it was necessary for Bourdieu to
see habitus functioning as a black box. This allowed him to ‘explain with
one single, definitive word why social groups, and the individuals who
constitute them, reproduced identical behaviours’ (Grignon, 1996: 96).
Bourdieu often responded to these criticisms. For example, in
Pascalian Meditations he reminded us that habitus is not ‘this monolithic
principle (through which the past determines future actions)’ and in several
instances he ‘drew attention to the existence of cleaved, torn habitus bearing
the mark of the contradictions which produced them’ (1997: 78). But he was
not always heard.
Start with Pierre Bourdieu to Move Away from Him
Fortunately, all critical comments are not as negative as those of Verdes-
Leroux and Alexander. For some time now, various authors have charted
new pathways. Since it is not possible to comment on each of these, we will
focus on two such pathways – the pragmatic social actor theory of L. Boltan-
ski and L. Thévenot, and the psychological sociology of B. Lahire – noting
however that all these alternative approaches are linked by their idiosyn-
cratic relationship to Bourdieu’s work, without nonetheless being critical of
it. Following in their footsteps, I believe that:
. . . absolute detestation or outright rejection are pointless. But sterile shows
of support or praise are not much healthier than sterile questioning. In my
opinion, true scientific respect towards a work (and its author) is expressed
in rigorous discussion and evaluation and not in the endless repetition of
concepts, established arguments, etc. (Lahire, 2001a: 17–18) 
This project may seem ambitious, for discussing Bourdieu’s theses entails
a discussion of all those influences which allowed him to develop them.






One finds in them multiple interpretative schemes drawn from the inter-
national heritage of research in social and human sciences. [. . .] An outright
condemnation and rejection of his entire work amounts to the unintentional
rejection of intellectual schemes or habits he drew from a large number of
works by authors such as J. Austin, G. Bachelard, E. Benveniste, N. Chomsky,
E. Durkheim, N. Elias, S. Freud, J. Piaget, E. Husserl, E. Kant, G. W. Leibniz,
C. Lévi-Strauss, M. Mauss, K. Marx, M. Merleau-Ponty, J.-P. Sartre, M.
Weber, L. Wittgenstein, etc. (2001: 10–11).
It is unfortunate that, once established, this rich synthesis is presently
utilized by many like a rigid reading grid of the world, which was meant to
apply to an increasingly wide range of fields (religion, education, politics,
journalism, economy, art, the intellectual world, etc.) without taking into
account the fact that a correct understanding of some situations requires the
application of other paradigms. As they hardly considered the evolution of
sociology beyond their journal, Les Actes de la Recherche en Sciences
Sociales, Bourdieu’s followers may have fallen into the trap of ‘a routinisa-
tion of the production, of the repeated and repetitive application of estab-
lished processes’, a trap they used to denounce themselves (Bourdieu, 1992:
352). They use their key concepts repeatedly, when it may have been neces-
sary to refine and qualify them further. In his commentary, Alexander states
that Bourdieu’s model is designed to be repeated and reproduced on
demand: ‘practice is habitualized, habits are economized, and both practice
and habitus give way to conceptions of unconscious strategizing oriented to
structures of domination that almost always take on a class form’ (Alexander,
1995: 161). And this holds true at any time and in every social group. We
should therefore clarify the meaning of some aspects of Bourdieu’s theories
and develop them in a critical way. For ‘a self-closure with an automatic
application to various fields of investigation, without challenging the foun-
dations or allowing debate, means only one thing: fossilization’ (Mounier,
2001: 214). I think that ‘if one has to start thinking from Pierre Bourdieu,
one also has to think away from him’ (Favereau, 2001: 307). We would like
to demonstrate that Bourdieu’s model contains resources that he himself did
not exploit and that his disciples forgot about, leading to a weakening of its
impact.
This is the thesis we can develop from this intention: Bourdieu’s soci-
ology could transcend its limitations by taking into account the wide fields
explored by those authors whom he quotes to build his own theories, yet
which he hauntingly disregards. His thinking should to be diversified and
new research areas should be opened.
There is a literature showing the influence of psychoanalysis and
Wittgenstein on Bourdieu’s work (for Freud and psychoanalysis, see Dubois,
2000; Fourny, 2000; for Wittgenstein see Bourdieu himself, 1994a;
Chauviré, 1995; Pinto, 1998; Shusterman, 1999). Two other currents, which
have emerged in French sociology in the last few years, and were developed
by L. Boltanski and L. Thévenot, on the one hand, and B. Lahire, on the






other, have also been influenced by Wittgenstein and Freud, although they
have not stated this explicitly. Thus Boltanski has drawn on Wittgenstein to
develop a sociology which gives primacy to the social actor’s interpretation
of his or her situation through lay theorizing, while Lahire’s work clearly
pays a debt to Freud with his psychological sociology. It would therefore be
interesting, in the first instance, to tease out how Wittgenstein and Freud,
respectively, have influenced these two systems to demonstrate that they can
indeed be used to generate new sociological currents, other than Bourdieu’s
own. This would then allow us to explore how they could be used to fill any
gaps in Bourdieu’s work, thus giving the latter renewed relevance and
staunching its stagnating tendencies. But, ultimately, this analysis aims to
show how Wittgenstein’s and Freud’s theoretical influences can lead the
way towards a theoretical synthesis between Bourdieu’s critical soci-
ology, Boltanski’s social actor theory and Lahire’s psychological sociology.
Currently, these three currents operate independently of each other, without
any kind of dialogue. And yet, far from being incompatible, these sociolo-
gies offer opportunities for exploring how they might complement each other
and for mutual enrichment.
In sum then, this article proposes that, rooted as they are in a common
theoretical ancestry embodied in Wittgenstein and Freud, these three soci-
ologies can be coaxed out of their isolation and into cross-fertilization.
Trail I: From Freud to a Psychological Sociology
Bourdieu’s objective is to reveal the unconscious mechanisms through
which social and collective elements exist in each individual. He defines
habitus as an individual’s set of dispositions, tendencies, orientations and
actions that originate from his or her social group. They permeate each
person’s behaviour and everyday life without their being aware of it. Habitus
is indeed an unconscious without its mentalist and psychological yoke.
Bourdieu borrows Freud’s unconscious and interprets it through the habitus.
The unconscious no longer points exclusively to a representation which
exists in the mind but is unknown (and which may [. . .] be detected in the
psyche and made consciously known a posteriori by the psychoanalyst). It
is the set of society’s influences over our bodily behaviour which operates
without our knowledge (Freud, 1968; Bourdieu, 1997: 169). The habitus
displaces the unconscious of the psyche to the socialized activity of the
body. Bourdieu was relentless in his attempts to get rid of psychoanalysis
and psychology in order to focus on the unconscious social conditions of
human actions: the habitus, that is the set of matrices holding in each indi-
vidual’s body the product of past experiences (Lahire, 2001b: 124). What
we are not aware of, or rather what makes up our unconscious, is in fact our
incorporated social past, embodied in us in the form of dispositions.
But what are these dispositions, these matrices? Some agree on the
fact that Bourdieu does not provide any empirical descriptions of these
elements. Lahire shows that Bourdieu ignored that in the 1970s and 1980s
Freudian (and Piagetian; see Bronckart and Schurmans, 2001) psychology






defined such terms as disposition, mental reproduction of social structures,
etc. Not taking these writings into account prevented Bourdieu from answer-
ing the following questions: how is it possible for various socializing experi-
ences to inhabit the same body? How do they intervene later in an
individual’s life? etc. Bourdieu never details what he means by ‘the dispo-
sitions of an individual’. ‘We do not have an example of a social construc-
tion of incorporation or transmission of these dispositions. We have no
indication as to the way they can be built or the way they operate’ (Lahire,
2001b: 129).
Lahire’s main work, L’Homme pluriel (1998), tries to demonstrate that
the only way to solve these problems is to confront Bourdieu’s conceptual
apparatus with the facts, while taking into account their psychological
dimension. He asks: 
. . . would it be useful to continue speaking about disposition if one realized
that this term is more useful for theoretical argument than to understand and
explain social practices? Is this not merely what M. de Certeau did not
hesitate to call ‘mystical reality’, that is an additional level between practice
and structure to ensure theoretical coherence? (1998: 63)
If sociologists were unable to understand how ‘the multiple types of dispo-
sitions, schemes, etc. of habitus are psychologically constructed through
social experience, these terms would constitute an additional asylum igno-
rantiae in the history of sociological concepts’ (1998: 201). 
Accordingly, the following questions would remain unaddressed:
would dispositions fade away progressively or would they disappear through
a lack of actualization? Is it possible to destroy them through counter-
socialization when they become consciously known? Questions which, as it
stands, Bourdieu’s sociology is unable to resolve by itself.
This is the reason why we need to go beyond the ritual invocation of
the incorporated past. Lahire’s psychological sociology, also covertly
inspired by Freud, should show how we incorporate a whole series of habits
and how we experience their actualization. ‘We will probably discover a
diversity of ways in which the habitus is incarnated and realized: Habits
may be internalized and updated through constraint or obligation; it can
happen through passion, desire or envy, or even unconscious routine’
(2001b: 133). Psychology could also help sociology to study the question
why some of our dispositions operate and are updated in some social
contexts and not in others. Bourdieu does not allow us to understand how
an individual lives in a plurality of social worlds nor his own internal plural-
ity: which dispositions does he/she invest in the various universes he has
to explore? Bourdieu thinks that the dispositions of an individual’s habitus
are designed only to adapt to the sphere they come from.
According to Lahire, the more social contexts an individual experi-
ences, the more heterogeneous and un-unified his or her set of dispositions,
habits and learnings will be. It will vary depending on the social context in






which he or she is evolving. This is the reason why some dispositions may
disappear. Lahire is currently developing this method in order to grasp the
plurality of the individual, something that was done neither by Bourdieu nor
by his followers. It allows the comparison of practices in various social
universes. Lahire believes that it is necessary to unfold the social reality
within the individual, which is never as smooth and uniform as Bourdieu
might lead us to believe. A lot may be expected from projects such as the
one elaborated by Bronckart and Schurmans (a psychologist and a sociolo-
gist) in which they propose to associate every level of the habitus’s mani-
festations with the matching psychological conceptual construction:
elementary language and psyche, inter-psyche, mental models and psycho-
logical archaeology. They recommend a new utilization of an author who, in
his time, has inspired Bourdieu’s model and for whom he should have shown
more concern: Freud. And on this point, I am willing, with Jacques Dubois
(2000: 101), to wager that this does not imply a methodological aporia, but
simply that the potential of the explanatory model has not yet been fully
reached. One way or another, in the future, it will have to [. . .] integrate
psychoanalytical elements into its analysis.’
Trail II: About Wittgenstein. Common Language and
Intellectual Language
Let us now turn to Bourdieu’s favourite author, Wittgenstein, to whom he
gives pride of place in his own sociology. Bourdieu never contradicts him
and often has recourse to his work to lend weight to his critique of others.
However, as we will now show, he has paid less attention to the usefulness
of the aspects of Wittgenstein’s latter works, which give primacy to actors’
competences and which Bourdieu never considered, let alone incorporated
into his own corpus of work.
Bourdieu used Wittgenstein to develop his critical vocabulary. With
this critical vocabulary, he criticizes ‘prenotions’ and the prejudices
deriving from the spontaneous sociology of the uninitiated. He argues that:
. . . ordinary language which goes unnoticed contains in its vocabulary and
syntax common words which the sociologist cannot help but use. When the
prenotions (prejudices) take on the appearance of scholarly developments,
they sneak into ‘intellectual’ discourse without losing their credibility.
(Bourdieu et al., 1973: 37)
According to Bourdieu, Wittgenstein’s analyses lead us to doubt the idea
‘that the facts must conform to certain pictures embedded in our language’.
In contrast, he believes that these images are necessarily illusory because
they originate in a mythological and a non-scientific analysis of the social
world performed by lay people. And he thinks that there is an ‘epistemo-
logical break’ between lay knowledge and scientific interpretation (Bourdieu
et al., 1973: 95). Accordingly, people are enclosed in their daily action and
express their knowledge thereof thanks to the common vocabulary of






spontaneous sociology. The role of the sociologist is to perform a break with
this naïve knowledge. ‘He must impose unto himself a constant fight against
blinding evidences which give too easily the illusion of immediate know-
ledge’ (1973: 27). We note in passing that Bourdieu’s position also contra-
dicts phenomenology and ethnomethodology, whose advocates, with their
emphasis on presence-in-the-world, did not see the need for an epistemo-
logical break (Bourdieu, 1994b: 125; 1997: 175).
I think that Bourdieu does violence to Wittgenstein’s thinking regard-
ing the identification of the sources of illusions conveyed in our language:
In Wittgenstein’s mind, mythology does not originate in the social agents’
common language, but rather in intellectual language itself (which is the
same as the philosophical language). It is held that intellectual language is
‘a terrain safe to tread on. In reality it is a treacherous swamp. As soon as
we revert to the standpoint of common sense this general uncertainty dis-
appears’ (Wittgenstein, 1972: 45). In Stanley Cavell’s words, we find in
Wittgenstein ‘a fervent quest for the ordinary and the familiar’ (Chauviré,
2000: 42). It protects us from the fascination of abstract representations
which put a distance between us and reality. This does not mean that there
are no false representations in common language: Wittgenstein writes that
common language ‘continuously integrates scholarly concepts even when
they are vague or inexact’. It is as if philosophy were the element which
threatens to introduce errors into common language. Why is that? It is
because philosophy is the opposite of what it should be: ‘a critical thinking
which banishes explanations, constructions of hypotheses and only shows
the phenomena of the language without trying to explain’. If philosophy
remained faithful to its role, it would express ‘what everyone agrees upon,
what we all know but do not see because of its excessive familiarity’. As a
matter of fact ‘philosophy cannot start from common sense because the
business of philosophy is to rid one of those puzzles which do not arise for
common sense’ (Wittgenstein, 1979: 108).2 It is arguably: 
. . . philosophy’s task to analyse ordinary concepts and to give us a more trans-
parent perspective on them. But it should not try to replace or transform our
common practical concepts with rationally reconstructed artificial concepts
which satisfy the demands of theoretical discourse. (Schusterman, 1995: 605)
To sum up, Wittgenstein fears that common language is contaminated
with intellectual (philosophical) contradictions. As far as Bourdieu is
concerned, he defines the task of critical and sociological science as that
of the intellectual who refuses to accept ‘the undisputable evidence of the
common meaning’ (1973: 78). It is always necessary to go under or behind
the false evidence conveyed in the discourse of the uninitiated in order to
establish the true meaning of social facts. However J. Bouveresse defines
Wittgenstein’s thinking as the ‘exact opposite of a philosophy of the deep’.
The element which he thinks is characteristic of ‘the philosophical method
is precisely the fact that there is nothing hidden to be discovered, that






generally everything can be accessed at the surface’ (1991: 20). Bourdieu,
by contrast, wants to go under this deceptive surface of the common
language, which should always be the object of sociological suspicion (1997:
212).3 The common meaning should not be trusted. Sociology has to succeed
where philosophy failed by guarding itself against prenotions, ‘schematic
and summary representations’ deriving from ordinary language (1973: 28,
36).
Wittgenstein’s second argument departs from this requirement. He
writes in Philosophical Investigations that it is difficult ‘to see that we must
stick to the subjects of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and imagine
that we have to describe extreme subtleties, which in turn we are after all
quite unable to describe with the means at our disposal’ (1967: 46e -106).
In his perspective, ‘it was not of any possible interest to us to find out empiri-
cally “that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-
and-such” – whatever that may mean’ (1967: 47e-109). Reflection should
describe real everyday usage of the language rather than undermine it.
Wittgenstein asked intellectuals whether this language was too materialis-
tic or too crude. It may be so for Bourdieu, who sees it as generally rife with
prejudices and illusions.
This raises the following question: would Bourdieu be opposed to
Wittgenstein’s hope to see the birth of ‘a philosophy of the common
meaning’? I believe this to be the case. Had he taken into account this
aspect of Wittgenstein’s work, Bourdieu might have opened a dialogue with
pragmatic sociologists such as Latour, Bloor, Boltanski and Thévenot. Only
with them is it possible to continue the development of Wittgenstein’s
project: to study primitive instances of common languages with the assump-
tion that ‘it is a fallacy to suppose these languages are incomplete’ (1979:
101). These sociologies receive a priori the discourse of the actors as the
result of a coherent interpretative effort. They take into account ‘ordinary
speaking subjects’. These subjects co-state the discourse that constantly
intervenes in the construction of meaning. They are able to construct and
deconstruct their practices. We are far from the discourse rife with illusions
that Bourdieu talks about. For Boltanski and Thévenot, ‘people, just like
scientists, continuously suspect, ask questions and test the world in their
everyday lives’ (1991: 54).4 In some situations ‘the actors expose and unfold
their actions verbally’. Using language, they attempt to generalize and put
facts together. They use language in a manner which is similar to the scien-
tific usage of language’ (1991: 436).
This is the reason why they suggest a transition from a critical soci-
ology (as espoused by Bourdieu) to a sociology of critical action, without
nonetheless discarding the former (Boltanski, 1990: 50–51). The latter
posits that social actors are able to manipulate the critical language with
which they interpret their actions or practices. Within this paradigm, soci-
ologists ‘would abandon their belief that their interpretations carry more
weight than those of social actors’ and instead would attempt ‘to clarify the
words the actors use to justify their actions’ (1990: 58). Accordingly






sociologists would no longer try to highlight the determinations which,
because they are embodied in the social actors, would drive their behav-
iours, but understand how they themselves justify their behaviours.
Note that this sociology, which takes into account the actors’ critical
capacities, does not make up the whole of Boltanski’s and Thévenot’s work.
It describes only one of the modes of action (le régime de justification or
justification regime) that people use for living together. They identify three
other modes of action which make up their theory of the four regimes of
action: the conflict regime (la dispute en violence), the peace regime (la paix
en justesse), the love agape regime (l’amour agapé). But they devote most of
their attention to the justification regime and it is that which is mainly
relevant to our present discussion.
In sum, a sociology of critical action would allow us fully to utilize
Wittgenstein’s contribution. Ultimately Wittgenstein’s thought can be most
usefully applied to these performative sociologies ‘which elicit from social
actors themselves the theory of their practices, working on the assumption
that they have the required competencies to do so’ (Callon, 1999: 76).
Scientific Truth vs Common Sense
What I have tried to establish in the preceding pages is that a different
approach to the authors Bourdieu refers to (whether he later questions their
positions or not) could make it possible to construct new tools for an analysis
of the social context. At a time when any statement is assessed as a defence
or an indictment of Pierre Bourdieu, it seems important to open up new
avenues of research that would be at least partly consistent with the socio-
logical paradigms that have been developed later. We cannot ignore the
significance of such pioneering works as L’Esquisse d’une théorie de la
pratique (Outline of a Theory of Practice, 1972, trans. 1977) or Le Sens
pratique (The Logic of Practice, 1980, trans. 1990). Notions such as habitus,
symbolic capital and practice that he developed in them allowed new socio-
logical approaches and gave philosophers richer conceptual tools to grasp
people’s social permeability (a permeability that is expressed in the ‘body’
as Merleau-Ponty used the word, an issue dealt with in another article). But
whatever Bourdieu’s theoretical achievements, neither can we ignore
Latour’s critique of French intellectuals. In their eyes, he wrote: 
. . . rationality can only be defined as an ongoing struggle against prescien-
tific thinking, against epistemological obstacles, against the deceptive
evidence of sense perception, against past science itself. This kind of
continuous asceticism is what Bourdieu offered until recently just as Gaston
Bachelard sixty years earlier or Georges Canguilhem thirty years ago.
Although science cannot be defined, we can define the movement through
which it keeps escaping the pernicious influence of ideology as well as all
forms of social, local and contingent determinations. (Latour, 1995: 12)
The majority of commentators will argue that Bourdieu’s thinking
evolved over time. While scientific criticism could be relevant at the






beginning of the 1970s when applied to, say, Le Métier de sociologue (The
Craft of Sociology, 1973, trans. 1991), it no longer applies after La Misère
du monde (The Weight of the World, 1993, trans. 1999). Here Bourdieu is
said to develop a kind of discourse that would radically differ from the ‘usual
scientific production’ (Mounier, 2001: 225). This book is supposed to corre-
spond to a break in Bourdieu’s work insofar as it presents the first symptom
of a determination to ‘account more markedly for the agents’ subjectivity’
(2001: 8). Yet we consider that the break is not as meaningful as a genuine
softening of his approach would demand. While Bourdieu is indeed
concerned with the agents’ discourse, he hardly grants them any reflexive
capacities. He claims that we still have to ‘explode the screen of common
words’ which inevitably creep into their speech (1993: 1403); that we have
to watch out for ideological distortions when those agents attempt any self-
analysis. In short, we have to keep ‘actively exposing the tacit prejudices
[or pre-constructs] inherent in common sense’ (1993: 1413). Even in Science
de la science et réflexivité Bourdieu still asserts that ‘science must see the
truth’ and ‘objectify the transcendental unconscious that the subject unwit-
tingly invests in her or his acts of knowledge’ and actions (2001: 173, 155).
However much his thinking may have evolved (and we certainly do not deny
that it did), he still adhered to Bachelard’s definition of science and to the
structuralist demand that the social unconscious that is supposed to deter-
mine biographical and reflexive illusions in social agents be submitted to
critical analysis.
On this positivist issue Bourdieu considers that only a sociological
approach that rigorously conforms to the demands of science can show the
real significance of the social agents’ subjective discourse. Yet while he
systematically reduces the notion of ‘truth’ to that of scientific truth and
even claims that ‘sociology is indeed a science just as physics is, he never
bothers to provide any hint as to what he calls “science” or truth’ (Pinto,
1998: 112), apart from the fact that both are bulwarks against what he sees
as mythological illusions of lay discourse. In this demystifying logic, soci-
ology, like the hard sciences, must represent ‘a historical locus where trans-
historical truths occur’ (Bourdieu, 2001: 136). At this stage of our
questioning two conclusions can be sketched. First, it seems difficult to
maintain that sociological theses (including Bourdieu’s) are true in a trans-
historical way, however pertinent they may be when located in space and
time. Next we fail to perceive why the scientific nature of sociology should
lie exclusively in a rigorous disillusionment process applied to the social
world (considering that demystification seems to be the key tenet through
which Bourdieu defines what a ‘scientific sociology’ should be).
Testing Cross-fertilization
While we in no way dismiss the significance of a work that is rich in many
intellectual breakthroughs, we suggest two possible ways of going beyond
such apparent dead ends.
The first one would consist in developing a psychological sociology.






Admittedly it would be difficult to claim a status similar to that of the hard
sciences for this discipline, which in fact would even markedly differ from
them, considering that it would integrate recent developments in psycho-
analysis, of which Popper says that it is not a science insofar as ‘it simply
does not have potential falsifiers’ (1974: 1004). On the other hand, psychol-
ogy or Freudian psychoanalysis can help us to try and reduce the opacity
in some of Bourdieu’s undefined concepts such as ‘incorporation’, ‘disposi-
tion’, ‘reproduction’, ‘matrices’, etc. Their genesis within structuralism made
such definitions superfluous since any mention of them systematically led
to an evocation of their status as ‘scientific’ concepts, thus as a priori valid
predicates. A psychological sociology would reverse the reasoning. As they
lose their status as scientific constituents in the accepted terminological
template of sociology, such concepts are questioned and defined anew so as
to be used in various empirical research projects in the full knowledge of
what they imply.
In this perspective we can circumvent two excessive attitudes to
habitus and its matrices. The first, as we have seen, consists in accepting
uncritically as such these matrices that are supposed to inscribe the results
of past experiences in the very body of the subject, thus directing if not
conditioning any future experience. With this attitude we would be among
those many sociologists who carry out sociology without even needing to
give those matrices a name and a more precise description, since they
operate on a transcendental level, just like the categories in Kant’s Verstand.
The second approach also critiques the inability to test out matrices empiri-
cally, precisely because Bourdieu does not describe them, nor does he give
them any substance: that is, he does not tell us what they actually refer to.
According to this approach, matrices are dismissed as fictitious and
confined to the status of ‘black boxes’ that sociology has to get rid of
(Boudon, 1998), instead of being accepted as conditions that enable future
experiences (embodied in the habitus at a higher theoretical level). As we
try to unfold the psychological (and thus subjective) functioning of the
habitus, we can open these black boxes, which have so far remained stub-
bornly locked, whether they were taken for granted or summarily dismissed.
The second way we suggest here consists in going beyond the restric-
tion Bourdieu imposes on sociology insofar as science for him is only a tool
to eradicate the mythological illusions to be found in lay discourse. We have
tried to show that Bourdieu, who sets himself up as a follower of Wittgen-
stein, should perhaps have followed his master’s lead more closely. As he
devalues the critical potential in the subjects’ relationship to those rules
that determine their behaviour (Favereau, 2001: 293), he denies their justi-
fying discourse any validity and thus negates one of Wittgenstein’s key prin-
ciples, namely that we ought to maintain a common-sense perspective. On
the other hand, in the sociology developed by Boltanski and Thévenot, a
subject’s singularity ‘is not reduced to an illusion, contrary to what happens
with Pierre Bourdieu’ (Corcuff, 2001: 112). The way in which a subject
perceives her or his own authenticity as it emerges from social interactions






retroactively modifies the latter and must be grasped by the sociologist, who
cannot but credit the validity of their discourse.
We see that these two alternative approaches, one using Freud and
psychological sociology, the other Wittgenstein and Boltanski and
Thévenot’s pragmatic sociology, can eventually blend into one. As they
recognize the validity of agents’ self-justifying discourse and lay theorizing,
Boltanski and Thévenot hint at what a sociology that would attempt a
psychological approach to the social dispositions in everybody might be.
In this sociology of regime-determined action (and justification), every agent
is given a plural mental and corporeal repertory, which makes several modes
of engagement in, and adjustment to, action possible. The components in this
repertory are not perceived as dispositions, in the potentially deterministic
sense in which Pierre Bourdieu uses the word, but as skills and capacities,
to be used or not in a given action depending on the encountered situation.
(Corcuff, 2001: 115) 
In order to identify the kind of regime in which the agent acts, we have
to take the agents’ discourse into account when they locate their behaviour
in a given justification register. For each given regime in which an agent
acts, some (socially incorporated) dispositions may be activated or cancelled
depending on whether they correspond to the kind of behaviour that is
appropriate. Some dispositions turn out to be more appropriate than others
in such or such social context. In other words, I will use some rather than
others depending on the specific context in which I currently find myself. I
have several sets of habits and skills. They vary according to the social
context and the action regime in which I have to act. In order to understand
what these dispositions are, how I acquired them, and in what way I imple-
ment them involves the agent’s justifying discourse (Boltanski and
Thévenot). This takes us back to common speech (Wittgenstein) and to a
psychological definition of the various kinds of incorporated dispositions,
so to a contemporary psychological approach inspired by Freud which
Bourdieu completely left out.
We hope that this pragmatic approach can legitimize the suggested
cross-fertilization of various schools of thought (Bourdieu’s structuralism,
Freud and sociology, Wittgenstein and his philosophy of language and the
sociology of pragmatic justification) – away from the comforting parallel with
the hard sciences. Numerous advances can arise from this kind of hybridiza-
tion. It can help us ‘find theories that will work’ and make facts readable
(James, 1978: 104). The main concern is, to echo James, that ‘we don’t lie
back upon them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again
by their aid’ (1978: 32).
Notes
I would like to thank Emmanuelle Tulle and Jean-Marie Frère for their contri-
butions to this article.






1. Bourdieu most accurately defines his habitus concept in Le Sens pratique. This
concept is ‘a system of durable dispositions (as general and organizing principles
of practices and representations) which are objectively adapted to their goal without
supposing a conscious design of goals and a complete mastery of the necessary
methods to achieve them’ (1980: 88).
2. ‘When we ask on what occasions people use a word, what they say about it, what
they are right to substitute for it, and in reply try to describe its use, we do so only
insofar as it seems helpful in getting rid of certain philosophical troubles’ (Wittgen-
stein, 1979: 97).
3. It should be noted that my reading diverges from that of Schusterman, who
argues that Bourdieu shares with Wittgenstein the same ‘appreciation of the
ordinary’ (1995: 605).
4. Boltanski and Thévenot’s conceptions are relatively close to ethnomethodology
because the problem is to interrogate the break between scientific sociology and
non-scientific or lay sociology. On this, see Garfinkel (1967: vii).
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